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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
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INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0081
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C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000313

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017

TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU CD ER LY

SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: NCP WILLING TO ENGAGE, SPLM TO ADVANCE
DPA

REF: KHARTOUM 00287

Classified By: P/E Chief Trevor Monroe, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)
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¶1. (C) In the wake of the announcements from the International Criminal Court (ICC), Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor told USAID Mission Director and Poloff on February 28 that the indictments might soften some of the hard-liners in the National Congress Party (NCP) and might "make them more reasonable." Though he admitted that some elements in the regime still oppose cooperation with the international community, he said that they were in the minority. "Human beings are human beings," said Alor. "They don't want to destroy themselves." He said that the majority of the NCP understands the gravity of the current situation and "just want to survive, even Nafie (hard-line Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie)." Alor predicted that the forthcoming response of the Sudanese government to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's January 24 letter on the UN Heavy Support Package would be positive

¶2. (C) Alor said that he had met with Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Secretary General Pagan Amun, SPLM Deputy Secretary General for the Northern Sector Yasser Arman, and First Vice President Salva Kiir on February 27 to discuss SPLM facilitation of a constructive political process for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories. For the first time, Alor stated that the SPLM would be willing to endorse the creation of a single Darfur state and a Darfur vice presidency slot--two primary demands of the non-signatories that the SPLM had long opposed. The consensus was that the SPLM would begin laying the groundwork for a meeting in Southern Sudan to push the non-signatories toward re-unification. Meanwhile, Kiir planned to travel to Darfur to follow-up on the recent visit by Arman to the region. Arman had told Kiir that even Arab tribes had expressed an interest in meeting with him and supported a more robust SPLM role to defuse the conflict. Alor said that the SPLM would be willing to advise the joint UN/AU task force on the political process (reftel) and that Amun would be the SPLM lead on the non-signatories.

¶3. (C) Alor suggested that the SPLM could also engage with the Chadian and Eritrean governments based on long-standing ties with Ndjamena and Asmara. He characterized the recent summit in Tripoli as a "fiasco" that had resulted in no progress. President Deby had told SPLM representatives who had attended that summit that "Bashir does not respect agreements" and was therefore reticent to engage in negotiations with Khartoum. Alor also said that Amun had traveled to Asmara after the summit. Eritrean officials had told him that President Qaddafi had been "aloof" during the

event. Qaddhafi had claimed that the summit had been President Isaias' initiative and that Libya had only provided the venue.

¶4. (C) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME